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Joint Ventures in China:
The Legal Challenge
On July 1, 1979 the Fifth National People's Congress adopted "The Law
of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and
Foreign Investment" (law or joint venture law).' To date, scholars and
practitioners commenting on the law have analyzed the text and focused on
its omissions and ambiguities. 2 This article attempts to resolve some of
those ambiguities and to describe the general investment climate by supple-
menting close statutory analysis with (i) a comparison of the law with joint
venture legislation in Eastern Europe and the experience of Western par-
ticipants thereunder, and (ii) an application of the negotiating experience
and results reported by foreign companies and their counsel3 working with
the law in its first nine months.
I. Introduction
A. Historical and Ideological Context
China accepted some foreign investment from the Soviet Union and
*J.D. (Virginia).
'The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign
Investment (adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, July 1,
1979) (declared effective by Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress, July 8, 1979), unofficial translation reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1163
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Joint Venture Law]. The unofficial translations of the law (see also
China's New Joint Venture Law, CHINA Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1979, at 46) differ in significant
respects. See note 123 infra.
2See, e.g., Klingenberg & Pattison, Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: The New
Legal Environment, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 807 (1979); Surrey & Soble, Chinese Removing Joint
Venture Barriers, Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 22, 1979, at 19, ol. 1; Note, Foreign In vestment:
Joint Venture Law, 20 HARV. INT'L L. J. 675 (1979).3Legal advice to foreign corporations planning joint ventures in China is a highly special-
ized practice. It also poses logistical difficulties. The U.S. Embassy in Beijing estimates U.S.
$1 million as the annual cost to a U.S. law firm of an office in China. Ringel, New China Trade
Lawyers Face Inexperience, Legal Challenges, Legal Times of Wash., June 11, 1979, at 31,
col. 1.
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Eastern Europe in the early 1950s, 4 and codification of commercial law was
attempted during the "Hundred Flowers" period in the middle of the dec-
ade.5 This experimentation was ended during the antirightist campaigns
beginning in 1957.6 Before the Cultural Revolution, however, foreign
ownership again was permitted in cooperation with the provinces and
municipalities. More than one hundred enterprises, including textile and
paper mills, rubber factories, sugar refineries and hydroelectric plants were
owned and operated with foreign companies. 7 The announcement of the
"Four Modernizations" by Zhou Enlai in 1975,8 the fall of the "Gang of
Four" in 1976, 9 and the call by Chairman Hua Guofeng for the "strength-
ening of socialist legality" 10 were the key events which led to a hospitable
climate for foreign investment. The acceptance of foreign equity participa-
tion in Chinese enterprise raises three major ideological issues: the depth of
China's commitment to the development of law generally, its attitude
toward ownership and enterprise as manifested in the evolving economic
and commercial law, and the reconciliation of the doctrine of "self-reli-
ance" with Western participation in Chinese ventures.
Written commercial law existed in China at least as early as the T'ang
Dynasty. I Scholars, however, have noted a traditional Chinese aversion to
legal structures and have attributed that aversion to the Confucian view
that a good ruler should govern by virtue instead of by law. 12 The cultural
and ideological tensions notwithstanding, the current party leadership has
determined that as a practical matter the "strengthening of socialist legal-
ity" is necessary to achieve the "Four Modernizations": "[L]aw is now
intended to be used as an instrument of economic discipline to foster the
order required for economic development."' 13
The more difficult ideological question concerns the substantive content
of "socialist legality," especially in the economic and commercial fields.
The first constitution of the People's Republic of China specified four forms
of ownership of the means of production: state ownership, cooperative
ownership,14 ownership by individual working people and capitalist owner-
4G.T. HSIAO, THE FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINA: POLICY, LAW AND PRACTICE 26 (1977).
'Cohen, The Year ofthe Law, in A NEW LOOK AT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS
WITH CHINA: DEVELOPMENTS A YEAR AFTER RECOGNITION 149-50 (H. Holtzmann & W.
Surrey eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as DOING Bus. 1979].
61d.
7Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 2, at 811.
'Surrey & Soble, United States Laws and Treaties Affecting China Trade, in DOING Bus.
1979, supra note 5, at 17-18.
'Li, Refections on the Current Drive toward Greater Legalization in China, in DOING BUS.
1979, supra note 5, at 83.
"Surrey & Soble, supra note 8, at 18.
"Surrey & Soble, supra note 2, at col. 1.
2 Li, supra note 9, at 85.
"Lubman, The Development of China's Formal Legal System, in DOING Bus. 1979, supra
note 5, at 136.
""Cooperative ownership" was defined as "collective ownership by working masses." PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONSTITUTION OF 1954, art. 5. [hereinafter cited as P.R.C. CONST.].
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ship.-15 When the new constitution was promulgated in 1975, the means
had been narrowed to two: "socialist ownership by the whole people [the
government] and socialist collective ownership by working people [individ-
ual cooperatives]."1 6 Although the constitutional law does not now provide
for ownership of productive resources by foreign corporations, 17 there are
many indications that the concepts of profit, '8 capital, and corporate auton-
omy 19 are being applied to domestic Chinese enterprise despite the hostile
constitutional climate.
Many scholars agree that joint venture legislation represents a major step
in the direction of a comprehensive commercial, economic and corporate
law applicable to both domestic and jointly held companies. 20 Despite the
assurances of Chinese officials and the optimism of United States academ-
ics, there are signs that Chinese officials are not united in their determina-
tion to follow this course. The joint venture law as promulgated resulted
from a compromise with officials who found an earlier draft too "precise"
and "liberal."'2 ' Even after adopting the law, debate about foreign invest-
ment continued. 22 And some joint venture negotiators for Japanese compa-
nies report that their Chinese counterparts still experience ideological
discomfort in discussions of profit, competitive pricing, fair market value
and management. 23
Largely in reaction to the trade abuses suffered by China in the nine-
teenth century, the Chinese communists have pursued a policy of "self-reli-
ance" since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on
October 1, 1949. On this principle alone, foreign investment from capitalist
countries has been anathema to Chinese leaders for more than thirty
years. 24 The recent desire to benefit from Western capital and technology
has forced a redefinition of "self-reliance" so that foreign investment is a
151d.
"P.R.C. CONST. art. 5 (1975).
"The contradiction between the joint venture law and the constitution is not lost on foreign
businessmen. Chinese officials report that potential joint venture participants "are mainly
worried about our proletarian dictatorship. They say the joint venture law contradicts our
constitution." Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1980, at 3.
"For example, Chinese banks recently have adopted a policy of lending money only to
economically viable projects. Cohen & Nee, Joint Ventures, Behindthe Headlines (pt. 1), Asian
Wall St. J., July 21, 1979.
"Some individual enterprises now are allowed to retain a proportion of their profits. Ching,
Chinese Seem Pleased with Limited Move to Give Enterprises Increased Autonomy, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 20, 1980, at 32, col. 1.
"'See, e.g., Gordon, The Developing Law ofJoint Ventures in Eastern Europe, 9 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 281, 312 (1974); Surrey & Soble, supra note 8, at 18.
2 1CHINA TRADE REP., Sept. 1979, at 9.
22Id.
'Japanese Joint Venture Negotiations with China Make Slow Progress, Bus. AsIA, Feb. 22,
1980, at 60 [hereinafter cited as Jap. Jt. Venture Negs. ].24Cohen, supra note 5, at 144. The nationalists on Taiwan have had a joint venture law since
1954. For information about joint venture law on Taiwan, see Hsu, Li & Wang, Joint Ventures
in the Republic of Chibu" A Study in International Business Cooperation, 3 DENVER J. INT'L L.
& POL. 59 (1973).
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new manif6station, not a repudiation, of the doctrine. 25 Under that new
definition, foreign investment, when undertaken in conformity with the
complimentary doctrine of "equality and mutual benefit,"'26 does not
infringe on China's sovereign right to control its economic development.
27
Counsel preparing to enter a joint venture negotiation with the Chinese
would be wise to study these concepts of "self-reliance" and "equality and
mutual benefit," and be prepared to offer and defend proposed contract
provisions in the context of those concepts.
Chinese leaders have specifically addressed fears in the West that China
will fall once again into "an age of strong political ideology" in which the
"Four Modernizations" and "socialist legality" will be abolished. They
argue that because of the depth of "yearning" by the Chinese people for
peace and stability, such a relapse is impossible. 28 Every potential Chinese
joint venture participant ultimately must make his own judgment about the
permanence of a hospitable ideological climate for foreign investment.
B. Promulgation and Recent Experience
Having made the ideological adjustment necessary to accept joint venture
investment, the Chinese leadership invited foreign capital and technology
to the PRC. Some companies, predominantly small enterprises from Hong
Kong and others run by overseas Chinese, agreed to investment before the
2 Vice-Premier T'eng Hsiao-ping explained self-reliance in his speech before the United
Nations General Assembly on Apr. 10, 1974:
By self-reliance we mean that a country should mainly rely on the strength and wisdom of
its own people, control its own economic lifelines, make full use of its own resources, strive
hard to increase food production and develop its national economy step by step and in a
planned way. The policy of independence and self-reliance in no way means that it should
be divorced from the actual conditions of a country; instead, it requires that distinction must
be made between different circumstances, and that each country should work out its own
way of practising self-reliance in the light of its specific conditions. . . . Self-reliance in no
way means "self-seclusion" and rejection of foreign aid. We have always considered it ben-
eficial and necessary for the development of the national economy that countries should
carry on economic and technical exchanges on the basis of respect for state sovereignty,
equality and mutual benefit, and the exchange of needed goods to make up for each other's
deficiencies.
PEKING REV., Apr. 19, 1974, at 6.
2 Article I provides:
With a view to expanding international economic co-operation and technological exchange,
the People's Republic of China permits foreign companies . . . to incorporate themselves,
within the territory of the People's Republic of China, into joint ventures with Chinese com-
panies. . . on the principle of equality and mutual benefit and subject to authorization by
the Chinese government.
Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 1.
2 The Chinese media emphasize repeatedly in their discussions of the joint venture law that
joint ventures do not represent any infringement of China's sovereignty. Lubman, Institutional
Changes in Trade with China, in DOING Bus. 1979, surpa note 5, at 177.
2 Speech by Rong Yiren, President of China International Trust and Investment Corp.
(CITIC), to Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration (Oct. 17, 1979), reprinted in
Stapanek, Joint Ventures, in NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR U.S.-CHINA TRADE, SELLING TECH-
NOLOGY TO CHINA 259, 305 (1979).
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promulgation of enabling legislation.2 9 Most foreign corporations, how-
ever, were reluctant to commit capital without formal legal protection.
Japan went so far as to prohibit direct investment in China until the pro-
mulgation of the joint venture code.30 Motivated by the need for technol-
ogy, and a lack of hard currency with which to purchase it,31 the Chinese
leadership assembled a special task force from the State Planning Commis-
sion to draft the law. 32 Unlike other codes drafted concurrently (e.g., the
criminal code), the joint venture law had no Chinese precedent. Therefore,
the task force studied other foreign investment laws, especially those of
Japan, Taiwan, Romania and Yugoslavia.33 Although the degree of their
influence is unclear, a number of private practitioners, especially Prof.
Jerome Cohen of Harvard, and Liu Yiu-chu, a Hong Kong solicitor, were
closely consulted by the Chinese. 34 United States and Japanese corporate
officials made substantive suggestions to the Chinese drafters. 35 All of the
drafting was undertaken in the first half of 1979, and the final draft was
introduced in the National People's Congress by its Legislative Commis-
sion.36
Seven new laws were promulgated on July 1, 1979 by the Fifth National
People's Congress. 37 Of these seven, only the joint venture law became
effective immediately,38 a graphic demonstration of the importance and
urgency with which foreign investment is regarded by the present leader-
ship.39 The promulgation of the joint venture law was accompanied by
promises that both the implementing regulations under the joint venture
law, and additional legislation dealing with company law, labor, banking,
foreign exchange, 40 industrial and intellectual property,41 and taxes, 42
29Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 2, at 812.
3°ld.
3 Stapanek, supra note 28, at 260. Peng Zhen characterized the purposes of the law as
"absorbing foreign investments and expanding international economic cooperation and tech-
nological exchange .... " Address to the Fifth National People's Congress (June 26, 1979),
quoted in Buxbaum, Continuity and Change in China's Legal Theory and Practice Affecting
Importig and Other Aspects ofForeign Trade, in DoING Bus. 1979, supra note 5, at 437, 440.
"Cohen & Nee, supra note 18.
33Id.
1"See Liu, China Brings Its Law into Line, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Apr. 6, 1979, at 125.
3'A General Motors vice-president for Asian and Pacific Affairs reported that some of his
subs tantive suggestions were adopted. GM. Seeks China Pact, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1979,
§ A, at 28, col. 1. See also Requirements in Relation to the Establishment of Joint Corpora-
tions in China (memorandum by Jetro (Japan) on file at the National Council for U.S.-China
Trade).
"The Legislative Commission of the National People's Congress was created in February
1979. Lubman, supra note 13, at 109.
"The other laws promulgated were Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and
Local People's Government, Electoral Law for the National People's Congress and Local Peo-
ple's Congresses of All Levels, Organic Law of People's Courts, Organic Law of People's
Procuratorates, Criminal Law, and Law of Criminal Procedure. Li, supra note 9, at 83.
"Cohen, supra note 5, at 144.
391d.
'See note 238 infra & accompanying text.
4 1See note 227 infra & accompanying text.
"
2See notes 246-54 infra & accompanying text.
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would follow soon.43 The implementing. regulations were reported to be
"under preparation" in October 1979. 44
The Chinese had hoped to delay the promulgation of these regulations
and new laws until after the initial round of joint venture negotiations, so
that those regulations would be workable and mutually acceptable, based
on actual practical experience.4 5 As soon as the joint venture law was
passed, however, potential foreign investors and their counsel began to
press Chinese officials for elucidation and clarification. 46 Foreign compa-
nies have been reluctant to sign joint venture agreements until the legal
framework is more fully fleshed out.4 7 China stresses that the legal protec-
tions desired by foreign companies can be provided now by contract,48 and
some officials even have noted that "the tendency for Western businessmen
to hold back despite the law's long-awaited announcement might have a
negative effect on future development of the joint venture program. '49
The most important reported joint venture agreement to date is that
among subsidiaries of Jardine, Matheson & Co. of Hong Kong, Schindler
Holdings AG, and China Construction Machinery Co., creating China
Schindler Elevator Company, Ltd. The venture, which will manufacture
elevators and escalators primarily for sale in China, will have a paid-in
capital of $16 million (U.S.). 50 The foreign partners, who will hold twenty-
five percent of the venture's equity, were offered substantial tax incentives5'
and succeeded in negotiating specific quality control and labor productivity
standards.5 2 The Jardine/Schindler agreement is significant because it is
the first large-scale industrial venture involving major Western corporations
not controlled by overseas Chinese. Also, its solutions to difficult problems
under the law have useful precedential value.5 3 Another contract, negoti-
ated by a San Francisco investment company, Eaton-Sung Pacific Corp.,
'"A Xinhua press release in June 1979 stated that the laws "are being worked out and will be
promulgated as quickly as possible." PRC to Bring Joint Ventures Using Foreign Capital,
Xinhua Press Release, June 29, 1979. Some of these additional laws are expected before the
end of 1980. Cohen, supra note 5, at 147. Drafting of the companies law was reported to be
"under progress" in late 1979. Li, supra note 9, at 83.
"Some of the implementing regulations will issue from provincial authorities. Guangdong
and Fujian are already involved in promulgating regulations for joint ventures. Buxbaum,
supra note 31, at 455.
"J. Leung, New China Deal May Suggest Terms of Deals to Come, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly,
Mar. 31, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
'Cohen, supra note 5, at 145.
47Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1980, at 3. The Japanese electronics industry has been particu-
larly firm in its refusal to complete joint venture talks until legal developments progress fur-
ther. See Electronic Companies Take Dim View of Venture Plan, JAPAN ECON. J., Oct. 2, 1979,
at 4.
"Cohen, supra note 5, at 147.
"9CHINA TRADE REP., Sept. 1979, at 9.
"°See Leung, supra note 45, at 16, col. 1.
"Id See also note 254 & accompanying text.
2See Leung, supra note 45, at 16, col. 2.
"Interview with Kenneth Bowman, National Council on U.S.-China Trade, Washington,
D.C. (Apr. 9, 1980).
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was widely reported as the "first" accord with a United States company
under the law.54 However, the agreement to invest $150 million over three
years with the China International Investment Trust and Investment Com-
pany (CITIC) is not a true industrial joint equity venture. 55
The fundamental tension between foreign companies' desire for legal
specificity and China's reluctance to provide it without actual experience
under the present law, has kept the number of completed joint venture
agreements far below the number expected during the first flush of enthusi-
asm for the law.56 As of April 23, 1980, only three joint ventures had been
approved by the Foreign Investment Commission (FIC).57 As of the end of
February 1980, only about ten agreements had been signed by Chinese and
foreign participants.58 Press reports of negotiations and agreements are fre-
quently inaccurate and imprecise in their use of the term "joint venture." 59
References to provisions of reported joint venture agreements will be made
throughout this article in order to illustrate problems and potential solu-
tions under the joint venture law. However, because counsel are reluctant
to share their experience or to reveal the terms of agreements presently
awaiting approval, this information is not widely available.60
C. Usefulness of Comparison with Eastern
European Law and Experience
The joint venture laws of Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia, and the
experience of Western corporations thereunder,6' provide an excellent basis
for speculation about the gaps and ambiguities in the new Chinese legisla-
tion. 62 In 1967, Yugoslavia became the first Eastern European country to
permit Western investment in state-managed industrial enterprises. 63 It
"See, e.g., New Chinese Concern Signs First Accord, for $150 million, with a U.S. Company,
Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1979, at 20, col. 1.
"See Coast Concern in China Contract, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1979, at D16, col. 6. The first
Eaton-Sung investment, which was approved by the Foreign Investment Commission (FIC) on
Apr. 22, 1980, was a venture with the Beijing branch of the China International Travel Service
for the construction and management of a $70-80 million (U.S.) 1000-room hotel in Beijing.
See Ching, China Approves Joint Ventures with Outsiders, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1980, at 19, col.
1 [hereinafter cited as China Approves Jt. Ventures].
"'Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1980, at 3.
"Feng Tienshum, head of the FIC's foreign investment bureau, revealed in an interview
that approval letters were mailed to the participants on April 22, 1980. Two of the ventures are
hotels, and the third is a food-catering service for the Chinese national airline, CAAC. China
Approves It. Ventures, supra note 55, at col. 1.
"Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1980, at 3.
"See notes 106-9 infra & accompanying text for a discussion of the terms and its use in this
article.6 Interview with Charles Stevens, Esq., Coudert Bros., New York (Mar. 29, 1980).
" See generally East- West Investment.- Proceedings of the ABA National Institute, Washing-
ton, D.C. 1975, 10 INT'L LAW. 3, 6 (1976).
"Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 2, at 813 n.22.
6'Horbaczewski, Profitable Coexistence: The Legal Foundation for Joint Enterprises with U.S.
Participation in Poland, 31 Bus. LAW. 433 (1975). See generally OECD, FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT IN YUGOSLAVIA (1974).
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was followed by Romania in 197164 and Hungary in 1972.65 The similari-
ties between the circumstances of joint venture legislation in Eastern
Europe and in China are manifest. Like China, Eastern Europe had been
isolated commercially from the West for many years. Like China, and
unlike the rest of the less developed world, Eastern Europe designed its
laws to introduce, and not reduce, foreign participation in the domestic
economy. 66 The adoption of joint venture laws in Romania, Hungary and
Yugoslavia "was the inevitable consequence of increasing consumer
demands . . . and the inability to fulfill these demands through less com-
mitted arrangements with Western firms. ' ' 67 The goals were the same: "a
deliberate growth plan which [admits] moderate attributes of market eco-
nomics, albeit clearly within an ordained context . . . to assure that a pri-
vate sector will not develop to a degree inconsistent with their political
ideology, '68
The task force which drafted the Chinese joint venture law specifically
studied foreign investment legislation in these three countries.69 Their use-
fulness as direct models was limited, however, by the fact that the Eastern
European laws were promulgated in the context of a sophisticated Euro-
pean legal tradition which China lacked.70 The usefulness of their practical
experience, however, was not so limited. Foreign participants in Eastern
Europe were interested in joint venture participation for the same reasons
as are potential China participants,7' and many of the same causes of hesi-
tation and caution were present.72 Early joint venture negotiations with
Eatern European companies were long and expensive, 73 and in the first
"See Foreign Trade Law (March 17, 1971), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 161 (1972),
supplemented by Decree of Nov. 2, 1972, Concerning Constitution, Organization and Opera-
tion of Joint Companies in the Socialist Republic of Romania [1972] B.O. 1, reprinted in 12
INT'L LEGAL MATS. 650 (1973) (Romania) [hereinafter cited as Romanian Joint Companies
Decree]. See generally Burgess, Direct Foreign Investment in Eastern Europe." Problems and
Prospects of Romania's Joint Venture Legislation, 6 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 1059 (1974).
5See Decree of the Minister of Finance on Economic Association with Foreign Participa-
tion (No. 28 of 1972), OFF. GAZ. (MAGYAR KOZLONY) No. 76/1972 (Oct. 3,1972), reprinted in
12 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 989 (1973), amendedby Decree No. 7 of 1977, OFF. GAZ. No. 35/1977
(May 6, 1977) (English translation published by the National Bank of Hungary (1977)) (Hun-
gary) [hereinafter cited as Hungarian Joint Venture Decree].
"Gordon, supra note 20, at 304.
1"1d. at 302.
68Id. at 283.
6"See text at note 33, supra.
7"Cohen & Nee, supra note 18.
"1These reasons include the existence of a promising market, the fact that trade is not a
significant alternative, the relatively low level of political risk, the ability to contribute technol-
ogy and "know-how" and thus keep financial exposure small, the attractiveness of an invest-
ment climate that lacks an inflation/deflation spiral, and the easy access to domestic markets
through the joint venture. R. KRETSCHMAR & R. FOOR, THE POTENTIAL FOR JOINT VEN-
TURES IN EASTERN EUROPE viii-ix (1972).
"United States business was especially wary of restraints on flexibility imposed by central-
ized planning, inconvertible currencies, the nonprofit objectives of the socialist partner, and
United States restraints on East-West investment. Id. at ix-x.
"Horbaczewski, supra note 63, at 439.
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nine years of the Yugoslav joint venture law, only 120 Western companies
took advantage of the opportunity for investment.74 As of mid-1978, only
three Western joint ventures had been concluded in Hungary.75 The initial
laws in Yugoslavia and Romania were followed with implementing regula-
tions, additional legislation and amendments. 76 When any elements of this
decade of experience in Eastern Europe shed light on the problems and
prospects of Western companies under the Chinese joint venture law, they
will be integrated into the analysis which follows.
II. Establishing a Joint Venture
Three new bureaucracies have been created in China to implement the
joint venture law. The creation of the China International Trust and
Investment Corporation (CITIC) was announced the day the law was
promulgated. 77 According to its charter, CITIC is a "state-owned socialist
enterprise operating under the direct leadership of the State Council."' 78 Its
purpose is "to introduce, absorb, and apply foreign investment, advanced
technology, and advanced equipment" and to coordinate initial contacts
between foreigners and their Chinese partners. 79 The Foreign Investment
Commission (FIC) is that body specified in article 3 of the joint venture law
to screen and approve proposed joint venture agreements.8 0 The General
Administration for Industry and Commerce (GAIC) is the organization
with which joint ventures will be registered. 8 '
Joint venture legislation in much of the less developed world expressly
precludes foreign equity participation in certain sensitive sectors of the
economy.8 2 Three approaches to directing foreign capital to certain indus-
74 Yugoslavia.- Dow Waits Out a Tricky Decision, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 15, 1976, at 40.
75These were (I) Volcom Hungary, a limited liability company, forty-eight percent owned
by Volvo Sweden, producing four-wheel drive cross-country vehicles; (2) Sicontact, a limited
liability company, forty-nine percent owned by Siemens AG; and (3) Redelcor, forty-nine per-
cent owned by Coming International (USA). Lorinazi & Dorian, U.S.-Hungarian Joint Ven-
tures. Prospects and Problems, 10 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 1205 (1978).
7 In 1971 Yugoslavia amended its joint venture law to clarify certain ambiguities and to
eliminate some provisions particularly objectionable to foreigners. See Note, Joint Ventures in
Yugoslavia.- 1971 Amendments to Foreign Investment Laws, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 271,
272 (1973). The Romanian statute was followed by implementing regulations, see note 64
supra, and a joint venture tax law. See Decree 425 of Nov. 2, 1972, Regarding Tax on Profits
of Joint Companies Constituted in the Socialist Republic of Romania [1972] B.O. 949
(Romania), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 656 (1973).
7'Lubman, supra note 27, at 176. Rong Yiren was elected chairman and president of CITIC.
7
sThe statute of the CITIC is reprinted in Stapanek, supra note 28, at app. C.79Lubman, supra note 27, at 176. On October 29, 1979 the CITIC and the First National
Bank of Chicago agreed to make the Chicago bank the CITIC's official screening agent for
United States joint venture proposals. The appointment does not preclude direct contacts by
United States corporations. Stapanek, supra note 28, at 279.
'Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 3. Western counsel were particularly anxious that
one decision-making authority be specified; whose approval would "clinch the deal". Owen,
China. Risks and Rewardfor Foreign Investors, Financial Times, July 10, 1979, at 22, col. 3.
"Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 3.
2Gordon, supra note 20, at 303.
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trial sectors are taken in Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia expressly excludes
specified fields;83 Romania specifies industrial sectors in which joint ven-
tures will be permitted;84 and Hungary describes the types of participation
which it will encourage. 85 The first draft of the Chinese law took the
Romanian approach and explicitly listed those industrial sectors to which
the law would apply.8 6 The final draft contains neither restrictions nor
incentives for investment in certain sectors. Nonetheless, the Chinese are
known to have priority sectors in which joint ventures will be encouraged. 87
Rong Yiren, president of the CITIC, in a speech to United States bankers in
New York, said that the government favors labor-intensive light industry
which results in exports or import substitution.8 8 Also, development of the
tourist industry is favored as a rapid way to earn foreign exchange. 89
Foreign corporations may make initial contact with the CITIC and vari-
ous provincial development groups, or with an individual Chinese enter-
prise.90 The fundamental details of the joint venture are negotiated first by
the participants. Their agreements on scope, term, capital, respective con-
tributions, production, sales, distribution, etc., are expressed in a letter of
intent signed by the parties.9' If the Chinese adopt the three-stage approval
process they have formulated, the letter of intent would be submitted to the
FIC. Its initial reception would tell the parties whether negotiations were
83Decree of Apr. 13, 1973, Concerning Investment of Resources of Foreign Persons in
Domestic Organizations of Associated Labor (1973) art. 3, OFF. GAZ. 743 (1973) (Yugoslavia)
[hereinafter cited as Yugoslav Joint Venture Decree]. Article 3 precludes participation in
banking, insurance, international traffic, communal or similar public services or activities
(except scientific research).
"Permitted areas include agriculture, construction, tourism, transport, scientific and techni-
cal research. Romanian Joint Companies Decree, supra note 64, art. 20.
5Hungarian Joint Venture Decree, supra note 65, § 2(1).
6CHINA TRADE REP., Sept. 1979, at 9.
"The earliest negotiations were with the Chinese Ministry of Coal Industry, Ministry of
Metallurgical Industry, Guangdong Petroleum Chemical Indsutries Corp., and Fourth Minis-
try of Machine Building. Stapanek, supra note 28, at 263. In December 1979, China formally
invited oil companies from several countries to discuss possible joint ventures to exploit oil in
the South China Sea. Xinhua Press Release, Dec. 10, 1979. China later reversed its position of
limiting foreign participation to offshore exploration, and invited companies to do inland
surveys. As of late February, nine companies had accepted the invitation. In a Policy About-
face China Seeks Help from Foreigners in a Searchfor Inland Oil, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1980, at
46, col. 1.
"Quoted by Stapanek, supra note 28, at 264. A good idea of Chinese joint venture goals can
be gleaned from the purposes stated in the China-Schindler agreement. These include: (1) to
"increase the capacity of the Chinese elevator . . . industry"; (2) to "update and upgrade its
products and manufacturing needs"; and (3) to "manufacture products suitable for domestic
and export use in order to meet the needs in China and abroad and generate foreign
exchange". Xinhua Press Release, Mar. 26, 1980.
"The first three joint ventures approved by the FIC were all related to tourism. See China
Approves Jr. Ventures, supra note 55, col. 1.
"The Beijing Economic Development Corp., the Fujian Investment and Enterprise Corp.,
and a municipal organization in Shanghai are the most prominent of these. Cohen, Huang &
Nee, China's New Joint Venture Law, in DOING Bus. 1979, supra note 5, at 195, 199. The
degree of autonomy and authority granted to government bodies below the central level is
unclear. Id. at 203.
9"Id. at 201.
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worth pursuing further. The FIC might direct the foreign investor and/or a
ministry of the Chinese government to conduct a feasibility study before
allowing the parties to proceed to a final agreement. 92
In the three-stage process, the joint venture agreement again is submitted
to the FIC after all of its terms have been finalized by the parties. If it is
approved, then all of the final documentation is drawn-up and submitted to
the FIC for formal approval. 93 Registration with the GAIC and issuance of
a license to operate is presumably aproforma procedure. 94
The greatest mystery is what criteria will be used by the FIC to review
joint venture proposals. The standards specified in article 12 of the Yugo-
slav joint venture decree and applied by the Yugoslav Federal Committee
of Energy and Industry may offer a good indication of those criteria rele-
vant to a developing socialist state:95 compliance with applicable laws and
regulations, economic benefit, adequacy of participants' resources to carry
out the proposal, fairness of the terms by customary international stan-
dards, realistic valuation of the foreign partner's contribution, and further-
ance of current national trade and finance policies.96 Although the FIC
intends to be flexible about its approval procedures,97 a lengthy process of
negotiation and documentation 98 is necessary to achieve complete clarity
and understanding in this cross-cultural and trans-ideological endeavor.99
The multi-stage process also gives the FIC considerable control over the
final form of the venture by allowing its permission to proceed at each stage
to be conditioned on inclusion of certain terms in the agreement. 1° °
Another device which allows the FIC to affect the terms of the agreement is
competitive negotiation. This technique involves engaging a number of for-
eign companies in negotiation for one position in a joint venture, and is
being employed to select a foreign participant for a major truck manufac-
9 I1d. at 201-2. Article 16 of the Romanian Joint Companies Decree, see note 64 supra pro-
vides for a similar "study of technical-economic efficiency."
"Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 201-2. Article 3 provides that the FIC "shall
authorize or reject these documents within three months." Joint Venture Law, supra note 1,
art. 3.
"Jap. J. Venture Negs., supra note 23. It is unclear exactly what licenses and permits (e.g.,
construction, export/import, etc.) may be necessary after licensing by the GAIC. Cohen,
Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 203.
"Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 2, at 820.
"Yugoslav Joint Venture Decree, supra note 83, art. 12.
"Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 202.
"'The Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic
of China, July 7, 1979, art. 1 (3), 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1041 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Trade
Agreement], provides that "commercial transactions will be effected on the basis of contracts
• . . between firms, companies and corporations, and trading organizations of the two coun-
tries .. "
"Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 2, at 821. Lack of careful negotiation and documenta-
tion resulted in significant financial loss for some companies engaged in East European joint
ventures. R. KRETSCHMAR AND R. FOOR, supra note 71, at 69.
"cCohen & Nee, supra note 18.
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turing venture. 0
The only document other than the joint venture agreement specified by
the law is "articles of association". 0 2 In other international joint ventures,
a variety of additional contracts and agreements are concluded as part of
the start-up documentation. These can include licenses or technical transfer
agreements, venture bylaws, opinions addressing compliance with the host
country's laws, and operational contracts providing for energy, services,
leasing or management. 10 3 Western counsel will undoubtedly press for
many of these documents. One agreement submitted to the FIC included at
least three separate contracts regarding technology transfer, sale of output,
and machinery purchases. 104
III. Structure of the Venture
A. Form of Business Enterprise
International cooperation between business enterprises takes a variety of
forms.' 0 5 The true joint venture' 0 6 is "the most complete and integrated
form of international business cooperation."' 0 7 In United States law, a
joint venture relationship is created "when two or more persons combine in
a joint business enterprise for their mutual benefit, with an express or
implied understanding or agreement that they are to share in the profits and
losses of the enterprise, and that each is to have a voice in its control and
management."' 08 In international practice, the distinguishing features of a
joint venture are generally the same; the venture is an independent legal
entity in which both parties share the right to profit and participation in
management. 109
Article 1 of the Chinese joint venture law authorizes foreign companies
"to incorporate themselves .. .into joint ventures with Chinese compa-
1'Ford, International Harvester, Mercedes Benz, Volvo and Renault were engaged in com-
petitive negotiation for participation in a $1 billion (U.S.) truck manufacturing venture. G.M.
Seeks China Pact, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1979, § A, at 25, col. 6.
'"
2Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 2.
"°
3See Berens, Foreign entures-A LegalAnatomy, 26 Bus. LAW. 1527, 1542-44 (1971).
°'Toyo Boshi, Japan's leading maker of cashmere clothing, signed a joint investment con-
tract in November 1979 with two Hong Kong companies and three Chinese enterprises, to
produce knitwear in Sinkiang province. The agreement is pending in the FIC. Jap. Jt. Venture
Negs., supra note 23, at 60.
"°'They include trade associations, "industrial cooperation", and unincorporated joint ven-
tures. Zaphiriou, Methods of Cooperation Between Independent Enterprises (Joint Ventures), 26
AM. J. COMp. L. 245 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Zaphiriou]. See also Taubman, What
Constitutes a Joint Venture? 41 CORNELL L.Q. 640 (1956).
" Joint ventures in the context of China trade must be distinguished from licensing, turnkey
arrangements, technical service agreements, simple sales agreements, and management con-
tracts. Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 2, at 813.
1°'Lorinazi & Dorian, supra note 75, at 1216.
' °Chisolm v. Gilmer, 81 F.2d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1936), a 'don other grounds, 299 U.S. 99
(1936). See general, Brown, International Joint Venture Contract in English Law, 5 D.C.P.I.
193 (1979).
'°'Lorinazi & Dorian, supra note 75, at 1216.
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nies." 0 As in Eastern Europe, l"' the Western partner is not invited to
invest in an existing entity, but must join in forming a new company, cre-
ated solely for the purpose of the joint venture endeavor. The joint venture
format clearly separates the ideologically suspect enterprise from the bulk
of domestic commerce. Article 4(1) of the law specifies that the "joint ven-
ture shall take the form of a limited liability company." '" 2 Because China
does not yet have a corporation law, the meaning of "limited liability com-
pany" under Chinese law is not clear. The language in article 4 does, how-
ever, seem to preclude organization of the venture in the form of a
partnership, association, or trust. 1 3 And presumably, the liability of for-
eign participants will be limited to the amount of their contribution to the
capital of the venture."l 4 The formal name given to the China-Schindler
venture is "China-Schindler Elevator Company, Ltd."' 15
B. Equity Participation
A dominant feature of joint ventures generally is the creation in each
participant of an equity interest in the new enterprise. 1 6 Articles 1 and 2 of
the Chinese joint venture law provide for and protect such an interest in the
foreign participant." 17 Some commentators argue that articles 1 and 2 "cre-
ate private property rights for the foreign investor in China."' 1 8 This, how-
ever, is not altogether clear. Under the Eastern European laws, "equity"
means only a right to participate in profits and management. 1 9 Profits do
not come in the form of a dividend on shares, but as a distribution of net
revenue in accordance with a contractual undertaking.' 20 The only rights
of the foreign participant are those which follow from the contract; there
are no rights extrinsic to the contract which follow from "ownership."'
12 1
Such additional rights also would be foreign to Chinese constitutional
law. 122 However, language in the unofficial translation of article 2 of the
Chinese joint venture law does colorably suggest that some rights other
"°Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 1.
.. Gordon, supra note 20, at 306. Yugoslavia directs that the venture take the form of a
"domestic organization of associated labor." Yugoslav Joint Venture Decree, supra note 83,
art. 1. Hungary allows "established economic associations" to join with Western entities to
form a "mixed enterprise," limited liability company or "joint enterprise." Hungarian Joint
Venture Decree, supra note 65. See also Comment, Cooperation Agreements and Joint Ventures
with Socialist Business Associations. The Hungarian System, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 752, 756
(1973). Romania specifies that the venture be a "joint company." Romanian Joint Companies
Decree, supra note 64, art. 5.
"
2Joint Venture Law, supra note I, art. 4.
"'Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 208.
11
4Id.
"'Xinhua Press Release, Mar. 26, 1980. See notes 50-53 supra & accompanying text.
"6See generally Taubman, note 105, supra.
"'Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, arts. I & 2.
"'See Cohen & Nee, note 18, supra.
"Gordon, supra note 20, at 292. See also Zaphiriou, supra note 105, at 248.
'
20Gordon, supra note 20, at 292.
11ld.
"
2See notes 14-19 supra & accompanying text.
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than those pursuant to contract may be contemplated: "The Chinese gov-
ernment protects .. .profits due [a foreign participant] pursuant to the
agreements, contract, and articles of association . ..as well as his other
legal rights and interests (emphasis added)."'123 However, a different trans-
lation, which, some argue, is more precise, reads: "and his other lawful
rights and interests pursuant to the agreements .... ,"124 Regardless of the
phrasing of the official translation when it is issued, no foreign participant
should rely on rights not specified by contract.
A concern more immediate than the characterization of a foreign partici-
pant's rights in Western terms is determining the degree of equity participa-
tion which is permitted under the law. Article 4 of the joint venture law
provides that "[in] the registered capital of a joint venture, the proportion of
the investment contributed by the foreign participant(s) shall in general not
be less than twenty-five percent."' 125 "[I1n general" suggests that the Chi-
nese occasionally will accept less than twenty-five percent foreign participa-
tion. Because no maximum amount is specified, the range of permitted
equity is, in principle, 25-99 percent.' 26 The law does not specify whether
foreign majority ownership is permitted, but Vice-Premier Li Xiannian and
other Beijing officials have been quoted as saying that Chinese majority
ownership will be the general rule, 127 with an occasional exception in capi-
tal-intensive ventures like mining.' 28 The first reported joint venture agree-
ments suggest that the Chinese are using the flexibility built into their law.
In the China-Schindler agreement, the two foreign investors together have
taken the minimum participation of twenty-five percent. 129 In the three
ventures approved in April 1980,130 and in two agreements signed with
Japanese firms, 13 ' the foreign partners' share was forty-nine percent. It is
reported that during the course of the now-stalled Sanyo Electric negotia-
tions, the Japanese had successfully obtained a seventy-five percent equity
share in a five-million-yen refrigerator compressor venture. 132
'
23Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 2.
2
'Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 205-7.
21 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art 4.
1
2
1Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 208-9. Members of the Harvard-PRC Ministry of
Finance tax seminar in Beijing were told that the joint venture law does not preclude the
possibility of 100 percent foreign ownership in certain instances. Cohen, supra note 5, at 145.
Several sources, including Rong Yiren, have stated that 100 percent investment will be permit-
ted. See Buxbaum, supra note 31, at 448. A wholly owned foreign subsidiary in China would
not be a joint venture, and thus not subject to the joint venture law. Id.
'Vice-Premier Li Xiannian said: "China does not confine herself to the established inter-
national practice of 51 percent and 49 percent. The proportion of investment from foreign
companies can be higher than 50 percent." Xinhua Press Release, July 17, 1979.
.
28Lubman, supra note 27, at 173.
'
29See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
3
'See note 55 supra.
'Recent Joint Ventures and Countertrade Pacts Signed or Pending, Bus. CHINA, May 16,
1979, at 66-67. In an agreement formally submitted to the FIC by Toyo Boshi the foreign
partners' share was specified to be forty-nine percent. Jap. At. Venture Negs., supra note 23, at
60.
'"ap. It. Venture Negs., supra note 23, at 60.
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A final concern is whether the equity interests of either participant are
transferable. Article 4 permits the transfer of "one party's share in the reg-
istered capital . . . only with the consent of the other parties to the ven-
ture."' 133 Some commentators have argued that because the protections in
article 2 of the law extend only to "approved" foreign interests, FIC
approval also would be a prerequisite to alienation. 134 However, this issue
is not significant; as a practical matter, all of the state-owned Chinese part-
ners would have to obtain central government approval before giving their
consent. 135
C. Capitalization
The Chinese joint venture law refers to the "registered capital of a joint
venture" and specifies that each party "may contribute cash, capital goods,
industrial property rights, etc.," as its share of that capital. ' 36 China antici-
pates that a significant proportion of foreign capital contributions will take
the form of technology and "know-how." Article 5 specifies that that tech-
nology "shall be truly advanced and appropriate to China's needs."' 37 It is
unclear how this standard relates to that in article 7, which requires tech-
nology to be "up-to-date by world standards" as a condition for receiving
tax breaks. 138 Presumably the latter is the higher standard; otherwise, all
qualifying technology would be eligible for favorable tax treatment. 39
Another problem is the tension between "advanced" and "appropriate."
Given China's underdeveloped status, it is probable that advanced technol-
ogy frequently will be inappropriate. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the
FIC will accept anything other than new (ie., unused) equipment. 140 In the
few agreements reported to date, the foreign contributions have consisted of
cash only,141 cash and technology,142 and equipment and technology. 1
43
'33Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 4. Yugoslavia requires a foreign participant to give
first refusal to the host enterprise and to obtain the consent of the remaining parties. Yugoslav
Joint Venture Decree, supra note 83, arts. 15-16. Romania allows transfer upon consent.
Romanian Joint Companies Decree, supra note 64, art. 13.
'
34Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 210. Hungary has no transfer provision, and in
this context Professor Gordon argues, "It seems reasonable to assume that in the absence of
specific contractual provisions, the substitution of a new foreign party for the original venturer
would require the same governmental approval as initially required." Gordon, supra note 20,
at 311 n.101.
'Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 211. No market developed for the joint venture
interests of foreign participants in Eastern Europe. Horbaczewski, supra note 63, at 443-44.
" 
6Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, arts. 4 and 5. For the United States tax implications of
various types of contributions to foreign joint ventures by United States companies, see
Pugh & Thomas, Income Tax Aspects of Joint Ventures Abroad, in PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD, PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS (1975).
'Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 5.
'See text accompanying notes 252-54 infra.
"'Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 212.
1"Id. at 213.
"'China-Schindler Elevator Co. agreement. See notes 50-53 supra & accompanying text.
" 
2 Toyo Boshi agreement. See Jap. J. Venture Negs., supra note 23, at 60.
"'Sanyo Electric agreement. See id.
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The Chinese partner's contribution to capital will most often come in the
form of land, factory buildings, and raw material. A contribution of land to
the joint venture will not involve a transfer of title, but only a capitalized
"right to use."'144 The agreements to date have involved Chinese contribu-
tions of raw materials, site, factory buildings, electrical installations, 14
5
machinery and inventory. 14 6
The most controversial and important element of capitalization is the
valuation of each partner's contribution. Article 5 provides that "the value
of each contribution (excluding that of the site) shall be ascertained by the
parties to the venture through joint assessment".14 7 Therefore, the value of
land will be determined by the Chinese-a potentially significant deviation
from the principle of equality and mutual benefit.' 48 However, Chinese
officials have assured foreigners that the valuation of land will conform
with locally prevailing rates. 149 In any case, Western negotiators should be
sure that the dates of contribution and valuation are fixed and that the Chi-
nese agree to revalue contributed technology if the foreign participant is
required to improve and update it.' 50
D. Control and Management
For foreign participants putting their capital at risk in Chinese joint ven-
tures, control of the enterprise is their most basic concern.'51 Some assur-
ance of effective participation in. management is a prerequisite to the
commitment of substantial resources. 152 In China, obtaining this assurance
is especially difficult because of the lack of a corporation law which spells
out management functions and the division of authority. Counsel to for-
eign participants must protect their clients against arbitrary action by the
other side solely through the terms of the joint venture agreement and arti-
cles of association. To date, control and management have proven to be the
most difficult points of negotiation. 153 It proved so controversial to the par-
ties in the Toyo Boshi negotiation '54 that they were forced to sign a prelimi-
nary agreement without settling on the composition of the board of
directors. 155
'"Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 213. Article 5 provides: "In case [site] does not
constitute a part of the investment from the Chinese participant, the joint venture shall pay the
Chinese government for its use." Joint Venture Law, supra note I, art. 5.
W'
4 Al of these were included in the Chinese contribution in the Sanyo Electric agreement.
See Jap. J1. Venture Negs., supra note 23, at 60.
'-The Chinese capital in the China-Schindler venture includes machinery, inventory and
two factory buildings. See Leung, note 45 supra.
"'Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 5.
'Cohen & Nee, note 18 supra.
'Bus. CHINA, Sept. 12, 1979, at 126.
'Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 214.
'Joint Venture and Investment Code, CHINA TRADER, Fall 1979, at 66, 67.
112R. KRETSCHMAR & R. FOOR, supra note 71, at 67.
"lJap. It. Venture Negs., note 23 supra.
'4See note 104 supra.
'"Jap. J1. Venture Negs., note 23 supra.
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The division of authority between shareholders and directors, familiar in
Anglo-American corporation law, was not chosen by the Chinese. There is
no provision for a meeting of the shareholders in the joint venture law, and
no indication of how the directors are responsible to the participants in the
venture. 156 Instead, article 6 merely provides that the venture shall have a
board "empowered to discuss and take action on . ..all fundamental
issues concerning the venture."'157 These include expansion projects, pro-
duction and business programs, budget, distribution of profits, manpower
and remuneration, executive employment and selection of auditors. 5 8
Some suggest that the new Chinese corporation law will follow the West
German model, providing for a two-tiered control structure with a supervi-
sory board representing the shareholders, and an executive board directly
responsible for management. 159
Article 6 of the law simply provides that the composition of the boards of
directors be "stipulated in the contracts."' 160 It does not suggest that the
composition of the board should reflect the equity shares of the partici-
pants. One commentator stated that the Chinese could use the law to dilute
foreign control when the foreign participant held a majority interest in the
venture.16' The first negotiated agreements tend to support this conclusion.
In the China-Schindler venture, where the foreign participants held a clear
minority interest, directorships were alloted in exact proportion to the
degree of equity. 162 In the Sanyo Electric negotiations, where the Japanese
company was to hold a seventy-five percent interest in the venture, its pro-
portional representation of the board was diluted to sixty percent. 163
Numbers alone, of course, are not determinative of effective control. The
procedures and requirements for decision-making by the board will be tre-
mendously important. Because the corporation law is not yet effective, the
only statutory guidance comes from article 6 which provides that "the
board of directors shall reach decision through consultation by the partici-
pants on the principle of equality and mutual benefit". 164 The phrase used
by Chinese officials to describe decision-making by the board is "unani-
mous consultation". 65 They have, however, assured foreigners that the
implementing regulations will provide explicitly that the Chinese board
"Presumably responsibility is enforced simply by the ability of each side to remove its
directors.
'"Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 6.
"8d.
'19Liu, China Brings Its Law into Line, FAR EASTERN ECON. REv., Sept. 12, 1979, at 126.
"Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 6.
"'See Lubman, supra note 27, at 173.
62The Chinese, with a seventy-five percent interest, have six directors; the foreign partici-
pants, with twenty-five percent, have two. Xinhua Press Release, Mar. 26, 1980.
'
30f the ten directors, six would be Japanese and four Chinese. Jap. Ai. Venture Negs., note
23 supra.
'"Joint Venture Law, upra note 1, art. 6.
"'Stapanek, supra note 28, at 267.
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chairman does not have a veto power.' 66 Counsel to foreign participants
can propose for inclusion in the articles of association a variety of devices to
protect their clients' minority interest. These might include a supermajority
voting requirement, 16 7 unanimous votes on specified fundamental deci-
sions, 168 or veto power by the minority in certain instances.169
Article 6 provides that the chairman of the board shall be appointed by
the Chinese participant, and that one or two vice-chairmen may be
appointed by the foreign participant. 170 However, the implementing regu-
lations may well provide that an occasional exception to the Chinese chair-
man rule is in order.' 7' Chinese officials have indicated that the president
or general manager of the venture ordinarily will be Chinese, but a Xinhua
press release represented that "experienced foreign administrators and tech-
nicians are permitted to play leading roles in order to raise operational
standards." 72 In all of the agreements announced to date, the chairman of
the board has been Chinese. 173 The Toho Denki agreement provided for
the right of the Japanese company to participate in the day-to-day manage-
ment of the venture,' 74 although the most specific management provisions
available to date are those obtained by Sanyo Electric. In that agreement,
the Chinese chairman was made responsible for dealing with local and cen-
tral government authorities, and a Japanese president was given overall
management responsibility. Each participant was allotted one vice-chair-
manship, with the slot reserved for the Chinese designated "vice-chairman
for labor", and that for the Japanese, "vice-chairman for finance".175 This
solution, which attempts to draw on the respective talents of each partner,
makes excellent sense, and should be a model for future negotiations.' 76
Liu Yiu-chu, a Hong Kong solicitor close to Chinese officials, was correct in
"'6ComingAmendments to China's Joint Venture Law. What to Expect, Bus. CHINA, Sept. 12,
1979, at 126.
"'See Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 217. In a Romanian joint venture by Control
Data Corp., the agreement provides that decisions must be made by a three-quarters majority
vote in order to give the United States company a more equal voice, despite its minority posi-
tion on the board. C. MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, JOINT VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE:
A THREE-COUNTRY COMPARISON 439 (1973).
"'In a Hungarian joint venture with Bowman Co., the minority foreign participant is pro-
tected by a requirement of unanimous voting on questions concerning capitalization, owner-
ship, unsecured loans, technology-acquisition contract, and five-year operating plans. C.
MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 167, at 450.
"'The inclusion of a veto provision in the articles of association was suggested by Liu Yiu-
Chu, a prominent Hong Kong solicitor. Lubman, supra note 27, at 174.
7'Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 6. The draft of the law had provided that the foreign
company could appoint only one vice-chairman. CHINA TRADE REP., Sept. 1979, at 9.
'Coming Amendments, supra note 166, at 126.
'Cohen, supra note 5, at 145.
'"However, Eaton-Sung Pacific Corp. will name the first manager of the Great Wall Hotel
venture in Beijing. China Approves It. Ventures, supra note 55, col. 1.
"'
7 Bus. CHINA, May 16, 1979, at 66-67.
'7"Jap. At. Venture Negs., supra note 23, at 61.
'Alternative arrangements, for which there is precedent in Eastern Europe, include alter-
nating the right to appoint the chairman between the parties, e.g. Semperit-Sava venture in
Yugoslavia (see C. MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 167, at 445), and delegation of
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her assessment of Chinese intentions: "it is quite clear that China wishes to
retain final control over joint venture operations. ... However, in those
areas which represent improvement of production systems and higher sala-
bility and profitability, I am sure that the Chinese partner will have no
objection to foreign control and supervision."' 177
E. Dispute Resolution
Dispute resolution between Chinese and foreign entities has been the
subject of exhaustive commentary in the West.' 78 The analysis offered in
the context of pure trade disputes is largely applicable to joint venture dis-
agreements and will not be repeated here. Article 14 of the law provides
that disputes which the board of directors fail to settle through "consulta-
tion" may be settled through arbitration or conciliation in China, "or
through arbitration by an arbitral body agreed upon by the parties". 179 In
theory, then, a foreign participant could negotiate arbitration in a third
country, or in its home country. The decision to allow arbitration outside of
China was a deliberate one, and was one of the few "liberal" changes made
to the first draft of the law. 180 As a practical matter, however, practitioners
familiar with Chinese intentions warn that "foreign parties insisting on
third-country arbitration will encounter strong resistance". 181 Once in arbi-
tration, or in one of the new "economic chambers" established in Beijing's
people's courts, the law of China and the principle of equality and mutual
benefit would control,' 8 2
For joint ventures with United States partners, the United States-China
Trade Agreement applies to all disputes "arising from or in relation to con-
tracts between firms, companies and corporations, and trading organiza-
tions".' 83 It provides that the parties first must attempt resolution through
"friendly consultation, conciliation, or other mutually acceptable means"
day-to-day decision-making to a "management committee" with a composition different from
that of the board, e.g. Bowman-Hungary joint venture (see id. at 450).
'
77Liu Yiu-Chu was quoted in Lubman, supra note 27, at 174 et seq.
"'See, e.g., Holtzmann, A New Look at Resolving Disputes in U.S.-China Trade, in DoING
Bus. 1979, supra note 5, at 235; Surrey & Soble, Joint Venture Law and Dispute Resolution in
China. A Framework/or International Trade, EAST ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Sept. 1979, at 3.
"'Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 14.
'8CHINA TRADE REP., Sept. 1979, at 9.
" Lubman, supra note 27, at 178-79. Liu Yiu-Chu concluded:
I do not think that (arrangements of other than the established Chinese arbitral system] can
be negotiated in the initial preparation of a joint venture contract. If a dispute arises and if
arbitration in China becomes very difficult or impossible and provided the Chinese side
arees, some form of external arbitration might be accepted by the Chinese side. . . . [B]ut
[the law] does not mean that the Chinese are ready and willing to concede that international
or outside arbitration is either necesary or desirable ...
Id. at 179. It is not unusual for East European joint venture agreements to refer disputes to a
third country. C. MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 167, at 450.
"'Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art 2. See Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 204;
Holtzmann, supra note 178, at 336.
" Trade Agreement, supra note 98, art. VIII(I).
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before recourse to arbitration in the PRC, the United States, or a third
country. ' 8
4
F. Right to Profit
The basic motivation for Western participation in a Chinese joint venture
is expectation of profit. Foreign partners thus desire that the right to share
in the profit of the venture be built into the structure of the enterprise. Arti-
cle 4 of the joint venture law states that "[the] profits, risks, and losses of a
joint Venture shall be shared by the parties to the venture in proportion to
their contributions to the registered capital."' 85 This, of course, is no pro-
tection at all, unless the definition of "profit" is clear, and the foreign par-
ticipant has the right to repatriate his share. In Chinese practice, gross
profit is defined as income less costs; net profit is calculated as gross profit
less tax and other mandatory contributions.' 8 6 Foreign businessmen are
concerned about the possibility that the local Chinese partner will siphon
the venture's profits by artificially raising the costs of materials, labor and
energy to the venture, and lowering the price of its output. Chinese officials
have attempted repeatedly to assure foreigners that they will receive a rea-
sonable return. Vice-Premier Gu Mu stated at a Beijing press conference
that "China will fully insure the legal rights of foreign partners in joint
ventures, they will not get less return from investment in China than in
other countries". ' 87 Some officials have spoken of a "guarantee of profits,"
but under close questioning CITIC President Rong Yiren defined that to
mean that there would be "no enterprise in which only China makes a
profit and the foreign participant cannot make a profit."' 88 Ultimately, for-
eign partners must rely on China's good faith, and on its knowledge that
manipulation of costs and prices to deprive foreign companies of profit will
terminate foreign participation in their development aspirations. 8 9
Another concern is that foreign participants be allowed to remit their
share of the venture's profits abroad. Article 10 provides that net profit and
other funds "may be remitted abroad through the Bank of China in accord-
ance with the foreign-exchange regulations and in the currency or curren-
cies specified in the contracts ..... ,90 Because those foreign exchange
regulations have not yet been promulgated, the terms of remission must be
detailed in the agreements.' 9 ' The Chinese may well attempt to tie repatri-
"
41d., art. VIII(2).
" Joint Venture Law, supra note I, art. 4. Romania also allocates joint venture profits in
proportion to contributed capital. Romanian Joint Companies Decree, supra note 64, art. 26.
In Yugoslavia, the allocation does not depend on the degree of equity interest, but on provi-
sions of the contract. Yugoslav Joint Venture Decree, supra note 83, art. 7.
...Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 224. For a discussion of tax, see text at notes 246-
54 infra.
"'Quoted in Stapanek, supra note 28, at 271.
"'Speech by Rong Yiren, note 28 supra.
"'Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 225-26.
"Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 10.
9'The Toho Denki agreement specifically provides for repatriation of profits to Japan. See
Bus. CHINA, May 16, 1979, at 66-67.
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ation of profits to the generation of hard currency from the venture's
exports. ' 92
G. Termination of the Venture
Language in the joint venture law suggests that the drafters did not con-
template the incorporation of the new enterprise for perpetuity. Article 12
specifies that the "contract period" be agreed upon between the parties
"according to its particular line of business and circumstances."' 93 The
same article authorizes extension of that period upon agreement between
the partners and authorization by the FIC. t94 Pressed to estimate what sort
of duration was anticipated by the Chinese, Rong Yiren answered "maybe
five years, or ten years, or even twenty years."195 The first ventures
approved by the FIC have lives of eight and ten years. 196 The more recent
China-Schindler agreement provides for a corporate duration of twenty
years, with the option to renew the venture every five years thereafter. 1
97
Article 13 of the law mentions three specific circumstances in which the
venture may be terminated prematurely: "heavy losses," failure by either
side to perform its obligations, and "force majeure."' 198 These circum-
stances should be supplemented in the contract by others agreed upon by
the parties. After four years of experience with its joint venture law, Yugo-
slavia considered specification of conditions for premature termination suf-
ficiently important to amend its legislation to enumerate them.199
IV. Operating the Venture
A. Production Concerns
Potential foreign participants share four major concerns regarding the
ability of a joint venture to engage in profitable production within China:
the availability of raw materials and energy; the lack of a legal context
within which to deal at arms length with other Chinese enterprises; the
necessity for coordinating production with the central economic plan; and
the availability of skilled labor. Article 9 of the law directs that "[in] its
purchase of required raw and semiprocessed materials, fuels, auxiliary
"
2Stapanek, supra note 28, at 271.
'"Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 12.
"Id. Authorization by the FIC and registration with the GAIC is also required for prema-
ture termination. Id., art. 13.
'Speech by Rong Yiren, note 28 supra.
'"China Approves Ji. Ventures, supra note 55, col. 1.
'"See note 45 supra.
"'Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 13. The Chinese meaning of "force majeure" does
not include strikes (unless against a third party), supervening government regulation which
renders performance impossible, nor "acts of God." Surrey & Soble, supra note 5, at 36.
'"Article 11 of the Yugoslav Joint Venture Decree now provides for premature termination
after two consecutive years of loss, if "business results are substantially below the envisaged
results", or if a party breaches its obligations. Yugoslav Joint Venture Decree, supra note 83,
art. 11.
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equipment, etc., a joint venture should give first priority to Chinese
sources." 2° ° However, there are indications that in many cases China sim-
ply does not yet possess the energy, labor and resources to support sophisti-
cated industrial production. A German-built steel mill in Wuham, for
example, was completed in 1978, but currently operates only one or two
days per week because the surrounding province is unable to supply suffi-
cient electric power.20 ' Chinese officials apparently are willing to guaran-
tee certain supplies for joint ventures. Rong Yiren has stated, "We admit
we have insufficient electric power, but for joint venture enterprises, we will
guarantee their power supply. ' 20
2
Article 9 of the law directs that purchases of raw materials and supplies,
as well as other routine business dealings by the venture with Chinese
enterprises, "shall be implemented through business contracts. '20 3 How-
ever, there is no contract law in China, and foreign businessmen are wary
because of the lack of a legal framework for their dealings with local corpo-
rations. Specific concerns include whether there are penalties for breach of
contractual obligations or for late delivery, and whether state-owned enti-
ties can be held liable to the joint venture.2 °4
A more significant operational challenge is posed by the requirement that
the venture operate within the context of a centrally planned economy.
Article 9 directs the venture to file its "production and business programs"
with "the authorities concerned. '20 5 Western businessmen fear that con-
formity with economic plans will undercut the venture's flexibility and
potential for profitable operation. However, the implementing regulations
may clarify the exact nature of the required coordination. In Romania,
joint ventures are required to prepare annual and five-year plans for sub-
mission to the authorities.2° 6 In one of the first Romanian joint ventures,
Control Data Corporation neatly sidestepped the stifling effect of five-year
planning by providing in its agreement that a new five-year plan would be
prepared annually in order to keep the venture responsive and dynamic. 20 7
China is rapidly developing an "economic environment" 20 8 by decentraliz-
ing economic decision-making and endowing individual enterprises with
greater autonomy.20 9 Therefore, the spectre of central planning should not
"°Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 9.
2 0 G.M. Signs China Pact, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1979, § A, at 28, col. 6.
°
20 Stapanek, supra note 28, at 271.
2
"
3Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 9.
"°'Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 230.
2
'Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 9.
2
"Romanian Joint Companies Decree, supra note 64.
"
7 Burgess, Direct Foreign Investment in Eastern Europe. Problems and Prospects of
Romania's Joint Venture Legislation, 6 L. & POL. INT'L BUS. 1059, 1087 (1974).
2
°"When Hungary substantially decentralized its economy in 1968, the "economic environ-
ment" was described as "a regulated market-in which the enterprises [are] endowed with a
wide scope of authority for making their own decisions . Gerenaser, Planning at the
Company Level, HUNGARIAN ECON., Apr. 1977, at 9.
2
"See notes 18 & 19 supra.
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be a significant deterrent to potential joint venture participants.
Labor skills and productivity are reported to be low in Chinese factories,
largely because of the erosion of management's right to manage during the
Cultural Revolution.210 Foreigners involved with manufacturing in China
report that factories are plagued by inefficient workers and serious
problems of overstaffing. 21' Potential joint venture participants are particu-
larly concerned that China will rotate its workers through the joint ventures
for exposure to Western technology and management methods. A high
turnover rate would reduce productivity and profits.
2 12
A variety of contractual provisions and assurances by Chinese officials
have emerged to allay these concerns. Rong Yiren has promised that China
will select more highly skilled workers for employment in joint ventures,
and predicted that examinations will be used to select these workers. 21 3 In
addition, bonuses already have been introduced in domestic enterprises to
increase productivity. Pay scales in joint ventures will be higher than those
prevailing in other local companies, 2 14 and foreign participants can negoti-
ate the right to offer other incentives to raise worker productivity.
21 5
Although specific guidelines on labor relations are anticipated in the forth-
coming labor law, the joint venture law gives the directors the power to
make decisions "concerning manpower and payscales". 2 16 Therefore, the
foreign partner will be able to participate in hiring and firing. The best
assurances regarding labor productivity and all other production-related
matters may be had by negotiating specific guarantees in the joint venture
agreement. Such assurances were secured in the China-Schindler agree-
ment, where the Chinese partner agreed to specific standards for production
levels, quality control, and labor productivity.
2 17
B. Technology
Article 5 of the law specifies that the foreign participant's technological
contribution be "truly advanced", and provides a penalty for "losses caused
by deception through the intentional provision of outdated equipment."
21 8
This "deception clause" was not contained in the first draft of the law and is
considered "highly unorthodox" by many Western corporate lawyers.
2 19
Penalties for fraud normally are covered in criminal, and not commercial,
2
"Owen, China. Risks and Rewards/or Foreign Investors, Financial Times, July 10, 1979, at
22, col. 3.
.. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1979, § A, at 28, col. 6.
2 2Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 219.
2
"
3Stapanek, supra note 28, at 270.
2
"'Id. Hong Kong businessmen in Guangdong province already pay 30-50 percent above
the national average industrial wage. Id. at 271.
21 Ventures in China May Offer Workers Material Incentives, Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1979, at 19.2
*'Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 6.
2 See note 45 supra.
2
'Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 5.
2
'CHINA TRADE REP., Sept. 1979, at 9.
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codes.220 The law also provides a tax break for technology which is "up-to-
date by world standards."'22 1 Despite the obvious priority which the Chi-
nese attach to high technology transfer, they have not yet taken the single
most important step toward that end-the legal protection of industrial and
intellectual property.222 The protection of patents, trademarks and copy-
rights is a major operational concern of potential joint venture participants.
China is not a signatory state to either the Paris Convention, 223 the Berne
Convention,224 nor the Universal Copyright Convention. 225 However, by
terms of the United States-China Trade Agreement, United States persons
may acquire patent, trademark and copyright protections equivalent to
those "correspondingly accorded by the other Party". 226 In the absence of
legislation on industrial property rights, which is reportedly under prepara-
tion,227 foreign participants should negotiate the explicit terms of their




In Eastern Europe, pricing has been a "chronic problem" for foreign
joint ventures.229 The communist partners have been used to making cen-
tralized pricing decisions based on a variety of policy factors not including
market demand and profit. Article 9 of the Chinese law provides that a
venture is "encouraged to market its products outside China", but may also
sell in the domestic market. 230 It is silent on the issue of how the venture's
output is to be priced. Rong Yiren assured foreign businessmen in October
1979 that "ordinarily, the prices of the product will be set by world market
prices". 23 1 However, if the output is primarily marketed domestically, then
the price would be set by the Chinese. 232 Foreign partners will want to take
"°Article 151 of China's Criminal Code provides penalties for fraud. Id.
22 Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 7.
.
2 See generally Fisher, US Firms, Trademarks and China, U.S. CHINA Bus. REV., May-
June 1974; Hsia & Huan, Laws ofthe People's Republic of China on Industrial and Intellectual
Property, 5 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 743 (1973); W. SURREY & D. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § I-6B.4 (1977).
223 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property Rights, done at Stockholm,
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923.
"'Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; see WORLD INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITER-
ARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (TEXTS).
..
3 Universal Copyright Convention, entered into force September 16, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 2731,
T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S.
No. 7868.
"'Trade Agreement, supra note 98, art. VI(3).
...Cohen, supra note 5, at 147.
... Surrey & Soble, supra note 8, at 24.
229Klingenberg & Pattison, supra note 2, at 824.
"'Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 9.
"'Quoted in Stapanek, supra note 28, at 268.
2321d.
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special care regarding pricing decisions for products sold in the West in
order to avoid liability for dumping.233
A major purpose of the joint venture law is the production of hard cur-
rency reserves with which to purchase imports. The Chinese will attempt to
insure that the venture's operations result in a net inflow of foreign reserves.
In Eastern Europe, the identical purpose sometimes resulted in a require-
ment that the foreign participant take its profits in kind.234 Article 10 of the
Chinese law provides that the foreign participant's profit and "his other
funds, may be remitted abroad through the Bank of China in accordance
with the foreign exchange regulations and in the currency or currencies
specified in the contracts".2 35 It adds that the foreign company "shall
receive encouragements for depositing in the Bank of China any part of the
foreign exchange which he is entitled to remit abroad". 236 Article 8 also
enables the venture to borrow directly from foreign banks, as long as all of
its foreign exchange transactions are conducted "in accordance with the for-
eign exchange regulations of the People's Republic of China". 237 All of this
provides little comfort for foreign companies now contemplating a joint
venture, for the foreign exchange regulations referred to in the law have yet
to be promulgated. A "State General Administration of Exchange Con-
trol" (GAEC) with close institutional links to the Bank of China has been
established to draft the regulations. 238 The exact nature of these regula-
tions will be central to the foreign participant's financial planning, and will
clarify exactly what proportion of his share of venture profits can be repa-
triated in hard currency. Until they appear, the negotiation of specific
terms in the agreement permitting hard currency exports will be a crucial
task for counsel to foreign partners. For United States companies, some
comfort may be taken from Article 5 of the Trade Agreement, which pro-
vides that neither country will restrict payments in freely convertible cur-
rency by parties to a transaction "except in time of declared national
emergency". 239
Financial planners also must consider the provisions of the law regarding
accounting, banking and insurance. The accounting methods used by the
venture are of great concern to foreign participants. Their profit and the
earnings of the venture will depend on the accounting methods selected. At
present, most domestic Chinese enterprises employ single-entry bookkeep-
ing.24o In late 1979, the PRC signed an agreement with Coopers &
Lybrand to train its accountants in Western techniques, especially the valu-
"
3 This has been a problem for participants in Eastern European ventures. See, e.g., Electric
Golf Carts from Poland, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 740 (1975).
"Gordon, supra note 20, at 794.
235Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 10. The law also allows repatriation of the income
of a foreign worker with the same conditions. Id., art. 11.2361d., art. 10.
237Id., art. 8.23 Buxbaum, supra note 31, at 455.
23
"Trade Agreement, supra note 98, art. V(1).
2'N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1979, § A, at 28, col. 6.
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ation of technology and "know-how" contributed to a joint venture. 24 '
Although nothing in the joint venture law specifies that modern accounting
will be employed, the Chinese Finance Minister, Zhang Jingfu, has assured
Western companies that "Chinese accounting standards for joint ventures
would be adapted to generally accepted international accounting standards,
provided that these standards are in accord with 'equality and mutual bene-
fit'." 242
Article 8 of the law directs a joint venture to open an account with the
Bank of China and to obtain "appropriate" insurance from Chinese insur-
ance companies. 243 The law also provides that the venture can borrow
directly from foreign banks, and the United States-China Trade Agreement
suggests that the PRC does "look with favor towards participation by
financial institutions [of the United States] in appropriate banking services
related to international trade and financial relations". 24 4 Also, the joint
venture law requires only the venture itself to obtain insurance in China;




The joint venture law provides that the "gross profit" of the venture and
the income of foreign workers will be taxed "under the tax laws of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China". 246 A number of United States academics were
invited to China in the summer of 1979 to discuss the options for commer-
cial taxation with Chinese officials. 247 They report that two commercial
taxes will have a major effect on joint ventures: a consolidated industrial
and commercial tax (CICT), 248 and an industrial and commercial income
tax (ICIT).249 The law provides for reduction or exemption from income
tax under two circumstances: when the foreign partner contributes technol-
ogy which is "up-to-date by world standards" during the first two or three
profit-making years, and when the foreign partner reinvests its profits in
China. 250 It is also reported that the Chinese will consider granting an
exemption from the CICT.2 51 Other Asian nations competing for joint ven-
2
"Hayes, China to LearnAccounting, US Style, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1979, § D at 8, col. 3.
242Quoted in Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 221.24 3Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 8.
2 Trade Agreement, supra note 98, art. V(4).24 Cohen, Huang & Nee, supra note 90, at 220.
"Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, arts. 7 & 11.2 7The most comprehensive English-language treatment of Chinese commercial taxation fol-
lowed from this visit. See Pomp & Surrey, The Tax Structure of the People's Republic of
China, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1979).2481d. at 12. Foreign companies are concerned that the CICT may apply to technology
imported by the venture, or interest payments to foreign creditors. Id., at 21.
1491d. at 5-12. Other relevant taxes include a real estate tax, a salt tax, a fur shipping tax and
customs duties. Id. at 3-4.
... Joint Venture Law, supra note 1, art. 7.
2 Pomp & Surrey, supra note 247, at 22.
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ture participants offer substantial tax incentives, and lawyers report that
most of the joint venture agreements now under negotiation with the Chi-
nese contain requests for total exemption from taxation. 252 The first three
agreements approved by the FIC skirt the tax issue altogether by simply
providing that the ventures will abide by Chinese tax law.2 53 In the China-
Schindler agreement, however, taxes were waived entirely for the first three
profitmaking years, and set thereafter at 31.5 percent per year. The agree-
ment also specifies a ten percent withholding tax on dividends f they are
repatriated, and a ten percent capital transfer levy.254 In September 1980
the National People's Congress approved a tax law which assesses the prof-
its of joint ventures at thirty-three percent. The statute provides for a one-
year tax holiday and half-rate taxation in the second and third years of
operation. An additional levy of ten percent is imposed if the profits are
remitted abroad. 255
V. Conclusion
In the nine months since the Chinese joint venture law was promulgated,
practitioners and academics in the West have produced a flood of critical
commentary and analysis. Much of the criticism has focused on ambigui-
ties in the legislation.256 Some have called the drafting sloppy and incon-
sistent. Many lawyers, sounding (as is their job) a note of caution and
prudence amid the initial euphoria with which the business community
greeted the law, concluded that the legislation was little better than "sym-
bolic", 257 and advised their clients to postpone joint ventures until the legal
framework developed further. As a result, few agreements have been con-
cluded under the law, and the entire foreign investment program may be in
jeopardy. 258
This article's analysis of the statute in light of the few agreements con-
cluded and made public, and with a general view toward joint venture
experience in Eastern Europe, leads to a somewhat different conclusion.
There is no denying that the joint venture law is, on its face, replete with
ambiguities and open to questions.25 9 It is naive, however, to attribute this
to lack of care or skill by the Chinese drafters. A simple comparison of the
first and final drafts of the law reveals the care with which the language was
drafted and "suggests a studied vagueness, and not a lack of research or
foresight". 260 The Chinese deliberately and wisely have opted for a prag-
"
21d. at 12.
253 China Approves It. Ventures, supra note 55, col. I.
"
4See note 45 supra.
2 N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1980, § I, at 1, col. 6.
"'See, e.g., Cracking the Cryptic Code, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., July 20, 1979, at 49.
2
.See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 5, at. 144.
2
'See text at note 49 supra.
2
.Vice-Premier Li Xiannian stated that the joint venture law was "not perfect". Xinhua
Press Release, July 17, 1979.
'CHINA TRADE REP., Sept. 1979, at 9.
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matic approach to foreign investment. The law itself only permits the crea-
tion of joint ventures, sets out the general principles necessary to reconcile
foreign investment with political ideology and establishes the institutional
framework for the process. 26 ' The law is inherently flexible in order to
allow Western companies to participate in the development of mutually
acceptable norms of operation. The forum for filling in the details is
exactly that which Western businesses would have wanted-the negotiating
table. The Chinese reveal frankly their desire to base implementing regula-
tions and additional laws on the results of the first round of negotiations.
Yet Western businessmen oddly eschew this invitation to participate in
shaping the legal climate for investment, and insist on waiting for unilateral
production of laws and regulations which they ultimately may find unsatis-
factory.262
The primary reason for this attitude is the conviction that the develop-
ment of a legal framework will provide further legal guarantees and thus
increased security for the foreign participant. This attitude is misguided.
China must be distinguished from the rest of the developing world with
respect to joint ventures. Its law is designed to attract foreign capital and
not to limit its existing influence. There is no motive for expropriation, for
all industry is already state-owned. The joint venture format provides an
inherent' element of security by linking foreign investment with a local
interest, thereby putting the success of the enterprise in the interest of both
parties. The question of security essentially is one of political risk. Under
the present leadership, in an ideological climate where economic develop-
ment is the principal national goal, the capital of the foreign investor will be
protected regardless of the scope and detail of laws and regulations. Con-
versely, no amount of finely crafted legal language will protect foreign
interests if China lapses, in the words of Rong Yiren, into another age of
"strong political ideology". 263 The crucial judgment for a potential joint
venture participant is one of political risk; companies should not be lulled
into false security by legal structures which satisfy Western tastes, nor
should they hesitate to enter one of the world's largest markets for lack of
legal detail.
The negotiation of a joint venture agreement under the law as it now
stands is a great legal challenge. Counsel to Western companies must assist
their clients in bridging a vast cultural and economic gap. Ideological con-
straints will force foreign participants to exercise considerable imagination
and skill to achieve their goals without the familiar tools of "owhership"
and "control". No amount of implementing regulation will change the fact
that the Chinese joint venture system is based on contract and not on prop-
erty rights, and on ultimate Chinese control no matter what the division of
26 Cohen & Nee, note 18 supra.262See notes 56-58 supra & accompanying text.
.
63See Speech by Rong Yiren, note 28 supra.
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equity. Samual Pisar stated the challenge well in the context of Eastern
Europe:
[O]ur habits of mind, or the habits of mind of our clients, who want to own and
control everything, must be adjusted if business is to be done in this area. Accept-
able, legitimate ways must. be invented to overcome seemingly insurmountable
prohibitions and, generally, a complex maze of theoretical and practical obsta-
cles.264
Those who meet the challenge and proceed now to the negotiating table are
likely to receive the biggest rewards in the long run.
2 Pisar, The Changing Economic and Legal Environment for East- West Investment, East-
West Investment: Proceedings of the ABA National Institute, Washington, D.C., 1975, 10 INT'L
LAW. 3, 3 (1976).

